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The aim of the this paper is to discuss 
the global branding and marketing strategies 
of Li-Ning, one of the leading sportswear 
companies in the People’s Republic of China, 
as it tries to regain the market in China, in 
hopes of eventually pushing past the current 
powerhouses of Nike and Adidas. Once they 
have succeeded in this task, Li-Ning will then 
take their branding to the international level. 
The data gathered shows evidence of the 
marketing steps and strategies they have taken 
in order to accomplish their current goal of 
gaining more popularity at home. The data also 
shows how similar Li-Ning’s strategies are to 
that of Nike and Adidas and how they are trying 
to separate themselves in a unique way. 
The theories of asymmetrical 
interdependence, cultural proximity and 
glocalization are discussed in order to make 
sense of the data I have discovered. This 
paper will conclude that Li-Ning has made 
tremendous strides on the home front due 
to adopting similar marketing and branding 
strategies from those companies that have 
proven to be successful. Even though they are 
still behind, they have come a long way. Only 
time will tell if they can make the final jump to 
No.1 and beat out their foreign competitors. 
Li Ning has the opportunity to not only drive 
away the global powerhouses of Nike (United 
States) and Adidas (Germany), but also to 
compete with them on an international level 
and perhaps within their own countries.
Theory 
Joseph Straubhaar introduces two crucial 
concepts to global media and communications: 
asymmetrical interdependence and cultural 
proximity, of which the latter is heavily 
dependent upon the role of the audience. 
In his essay, “Beyond Media Imperialism: 
Asymmetrical Interdependence and Cultural 
Proximity,” he states that asymmetrical 
interdependence is not the result of a one-
way flow of media products from First World 
countries such as the United States to Third 
World countries around the world. Instead, 
 it is a constant exchange between the  
spectrum  of cultures that enable a two-way 
mmunication flow and an equal dependence 
upon another. Cultural proximity is the idea  
of people preferring television programming 
 in  which  the content is familiar to them  
and they can relate to it.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the United States 
was charged with dominating global media 
for its own advantage, which challenged the 
one-way flow of news and information they 
claimed would benefit the development of 
most countries (Straubhaar 40). The television 
growth in Brazil through major broadcaster 
TV Globo and the use of telenovelas was 
heavily influenced by American models, yet it 
progressed enough to be able to fully compete 
with the US. “The result was the mediation and 
adaptation of aspects of the American model 
via Brazilian elites who then reinvented their 
own version of capitalist, commercial media” 
(48). This commercialism of Brazilian media  
is the result of going beyond American 
influences and tailoring their own home 
market, culture, economy and environment to 
their specific needs. 
It should be noted that national culture is 
not uniform and is instead, heavily dependent 
upon social class. For example, the “popular 
classes” of the lower-middle class, the working 
class, and the poor show a great liking towards 
national and local productions (51). Elites 
and the better educated tend to prefer US 
programs such as mini-series and music (51). 
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The role of the audience plays an integral role in 
determining the progress of the global media, 
especially those in Third World countries.
Straubhaar labors the point that “the role 
of the audience is seen within supposedly 
dependent situations, moving from a view of 
passive, dominated audience to one of an active 
audience, conditioned by class, age, gender, 
and interests, and tending to prefer and select 
local or national cultural content that is more 
proximate and relevant to them” (43). But it 
is important to keep in mind that despite such 
strides, many countries still continue to rely 
heavily upon productions from outside of  
their nation and region.
Roland Robertson introduces the theory of 
glocalization, which states that a broad, global 
concept or idea, such as a sneaker, can appeal 
to a specific group of people by focusing on 
a particular need at a local level. This can not 
only be incorporated within the specific design 
of the shoe as it relates to the smaller, more 
compact feet of the Chinese people, but also 
can be utilized on a creative level as well (i.e. 
integrating national colors or themes).
Background and Company History
During the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles, 
Chinese gymnast Li Ning made a name for 
himself when he captured three gold medals, 
two silvers and a bronze. In 1990, he noticed 
that China did not brand a high-quality sneaker 
in the sports performance arena. This is how 
the Li-Ning Co., Ltd. was born. Li created his 
company by taking the global form of a sneaker 
and localizing it to a specific need in a specific 
country; in this case, sports performance in 
China. “Anything Is Possible” became the 
slogan, one that is eerily similar to Adidas’ 
“Nothing Is Impossible”, while the checkmark 
logo is jarringly comparable to Nike’s “swoosh.” 
Li-Ning is modeling itself on international 
companies who have already proven to be 
successful, yet adapting to its home market, 
economy and culture to create a brand specified 
for the people of China. This marketing 
strategy best exemplifies the academic concepts 
introduced by Straubhaar and Robertson.
Li-Ning appeals to the Chinese culture 
while the global media interaction consists of 
the “development of the appealing product, 
the expansion of its production, a continued 
expansion into export, and the eventual peak 
as markets and audiences became saturated” 
(Straubhaar 41). As a result, the rising local 
business of Li-Ning in China would not only 
actually compete with powerhouses Nike in 
the United States and Adidas in Europe, but 
audiences would eventually prefer products 
in sports performance such as sneakers and 
apparel that relate to their own culture rather 
than those that weren’t. Li-Ning’s marketing 
and branding strategy reflects the concept of 
cultural proximity. Zhang Zhiyong, President 
and CEO of Li-Ning said of Nike and Adidas, 
“They might have shoes that look like ours and 
everyone has things like shock absorbers, but 
they don’t have that eastern feeling to them 
like our shoes have. Every person from every 
country has different feet and we know how 
to make shoes that are comfortable for the 
Chinese population” (Rovell).
This task is easier said that done, however. 
The branding culture in China is unlike 
anything known of in the West. In the West, 
brands mean power, status, and loyalty.  The 
market of the East has the cheap, “made in 
China” stigma attached to it, where brand 
names are usually knock-offs. Joe Nocera of the 
New York Times said, “I went to a big five-story 
mart called the Silk Market, which was lined 
with tiny retail outlets all selling ‘branded’ 
goods of every sort…but they didn’t say, 
‘Do you want a purse?’ They shouted: ‘Louis 
Vuitton! Gucci! Armani!’ All the goods are 
knock-offs, of course. But it certainly spoke to 
the power of brands — a fake Louis Vuitton 
was somehow ‘better’ than a better-made 
unbranded purse” (Nocera). This is the market 
culture that Li-Ning is facing. 
In big cities like Shanghai and Beijing, 
Western brands dominate over domestic 
brands partly because of the elites and better-
educated people in the populous; high-end 
cities tend to favor Western brands like Nike. 
On the other hand, the lower middle and 
working classes of the smaller cities tend to 
favor the local, domestic products of Li-Ning 
(Straubhaar). Quite aware of this fact, Li-Ning’s 
promotion campaign is only concentrating on 
the second-tier and third-tier cities, it’s most 
important markets. “Although Li-Ning hopes 
to compete with Nike and Adidas in first-tier 
cities, where consumers wield the highest 
purchasing power, its fiscal reports showed that 
the Shanghai and Beijing markets’ contribution 
to the corporation’s income structure fell from 
10% in 2004 to 7% in 2005” (Cheung). Guo 
Jianxian, chief operating officer at Li-Ning 
“mentioned that the key for Li-Ning is to 
cultivate consumers in the second-tier and 
third-tier cities and draw them closer to sports” 
(Yifei). Several hundred outlets will open 
nationwide by the end of 2008, mostly in these 
cities. “The purchasing power in second-tier 
and third-tier cities in China is really strong. 
Everybody has their eyes on those markets, and 
Li-Ning must go there,” said Guo (Yifei). 
It is in these areas, where the population 
is well over one million, that Li-Ning will be 
able to establish itself simply because Nike 
and Adidas have not yet infiltrated them. 
Guo suggested to Li-Ning executives “to try 
to come up with shoes that have a distinctly 
Chinese flavor and would appeal, in an almost 
patriotic way, to Chinese consumers” (Nocera). 
Li-Ning responded with the creative and 
expensive green shoe that was made in honor 
of the famous Chinese solider, Lei Feng, who 
died in 1962 (Nocera). Nike first established 
itself as a premier sportswear and footwear 
company before it became popular. “Li-Ning 
has still has not convinced consumers that it is a 
professional brand of sports equipment” (Yifei). 
In order to accomplish that, Li Ning needs to 
figure out their unique identity, who they want 
to target and how they will establish themselves 
in China before they can establish themselves 
on an international stage. Chiang Jeongwen, 
a Chinese marketing professor at the Cheung 
Kong Graduate School of Business was brought 
in to give marketing advice to Li-Ning. “When 
kids wear Nike shoes, they feel as though  
they are the cool kids on the block. I said to 
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the Li-Ning executives, ‘What does it mean 
when you wear a Li-Ning shoe?’ They couldn’t 
define it” (Nocera). Chiang’s point was not to 
copy Nike’s model. Instead, Li-Ning should 
be creating a distinct personality that would 
separate them from their competitors.
During the 1990s, Li-Ning dominated the 
Chinese market. However, once the foreign 
companies of Nike and Adidas were allowed 
inside, Li-Ning found itself struggling to 
maintain their No. 1 position and by 2004, 
it had dropped to third with only 18 percent 
of the Chinese market share while their 
Western competitors each had more than 20 
percent. “There is a powerful sense among 
Chinese consumers that domestic brands are 
inferior—and a distinct lack of confidence 
among Chinese companies in the allure of their 
own brands” (Nocera). Li-Ning now faces the 
challenge of emerging as a reputable domestic 
brand in a country where no one believes in a 
Chinese brand. “And if these same companies 
want to export their own branded goods, which 
is where the real profit lie, they’ll have to learn 
how to create distinct identities that appeal to 
consumers—in other words, brands” (Nocera). 
Chiang, the marketing professor said, “‘When 
you get right down to it, Nike is a branding 
company’; to compete, Li-Ning would have to 
become one as well” (Nocera).
COO Guo stressed that “in the coming 
years, we are going to have to find a Jordan 
for Li-Ning. Nike had Jordan. Where is our 
Jordan?” (Nocera). Michael Jordan had not 
only the athletic ability and fame, but charisma 
to bring in 5 percent of Nike’s sales and $2.6 
billion of profit generated from selling Jordan 
apparel (Yifei). Right now, there is not a single 
athlete sponsored by Li-Ning that can compare 
to Jordan or be expected to bring in that type 
of revenue. China’s biggest athlete, Yao Ming, 
is not even sponsored by Nike, but rather, 
Reebok. However, China’s debatably second 
biggest athlete, 2004 Olympic gold medal 
hurdler, Liu Xiang, is sponsored by Nike, which 
has a full shoe and apparel line just for him. 
Charlie Denson, the Nike Brand president said, 
“When I think of Liu Xiang, I think of Michael 
Jordan in the mid 80s, I think of what Tiger 
Woods and LeBron James mean to Nike in the 
United States or what Ronaldinho in Europe 
and in the world of football” (Rovell). This is 
how Nike remains No.1 in the Chinese market.
Current Strategy
How can Li-Ning expect to compete on 
a global level without a Chinese front man to 
lead the way? Their answer: “Part of Li-Ning’s 
marketing strategy is to attract interest among 
the Chinese customers by using images of 
Western athletes” (Cheng). Those athletes 
include NBA stars Shaquille O’Neal, Damon 
Jones and recent endorser Baron Davis. 
“This cooperation marks another important 
step toward the international expansion of 
Li-Ning,” stated the press release on Li-Ning’s 
website. Zhang Zhi, CEO of Li-Ning said, 
“Professionalism and internationalization 
 have always been the operation targets of 
Li-Ning. This cooperation represents Li-
Ning’s another important breakthrough in the 
basketball arena. We will continue to develop 
such win-win cooperation, in order to make Li-
Ning become the brand of choice for basketball 
players and basketball fans and bring the brand 
concept, ‘Anything is Possible,’ into full play on 
the basketball court” (Li-Ning). 
Li-Ning first achieved global status in 
2002 when it signed a deal with the men and 
women’s national basketball teams in Spain. 
In 2004, they became the first domestic 
sportswear company to appear on the main 
board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. They 
formed a partnership with the NBA in 2005 
that allowed them to use the league logo as 
well as sponsor league players to promote their 
shoes and apparel. In 2006 they signed Damon 
Jones and Shaquille O’Neal to endorse their 
products. In 2008, Baron Davis was added to 
their roster (Liu and Young). Earlier this year, 
Li-Ning opened its first US office in Beaverton, 
Washington, Nike’s backyard. They hired Alan 
Hardy, a senior designer at Nike and design 
director at Converse (which is an affiliate of 
Nike), to lead the direction of Li-Ning’s new 
outpost in the United States. In 2004, they also 
hired Ned Frederick, a former research director 
at Nike, and Daniel Richarch Design, which 
has also worked with Converse, to develop 
technology that could compete against the 
Nike Air lineup (Balfour). “Having expertise in 
a region you hope to expand into makes a world 
of sense,” said Paul Swangard, managing director 
of the University of Oregon’s Warsaw Sports 
Marketing Center (Hunsberger). Li-Ning is 
using former Nike design executives who once 
The rising local business of Li-Ning in China would not only actually compete 
with powerhouses Nike in the United States and Adidas in Europe, but audiences 
would eventually prefer products in sports performance such as sneakers and 
apparel that relate to their own culture rather than those that weren’t.
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served for their biggest competitor, to ultimately 
push past them on the international level. And 
they’re doing it in Nike’s own backyard.
This isn’t the first time Li-Ning has used 
Nike as a foundation for their success. “It’s 
gleaming corporate campus near Beijing, 
complete with an indoor swimming pool, 
basketball courts, and a climbing wall, seem like 
a page out of Nike’s playbook” (Balfour). Nike’s 
world headquarters, located in Beaverton, 
Washington, consists of 16 buildings on 177 
acres (Nike). In the 1980s, Nike developed 
a light-asset based operational model that 
“entails outsourcing product manufacturing 
and retail and distribution business, allowing 
the company to concentrate efforts on design, 
research and development, as well as a sales and 
marketing strategy dominated by spokesperson 
and advertising. This generates higher rates of 
investment return with lowered investment 
input” (Cheung). Li-Ning then used this model 
to enter the high-end market and directly 
compete with Nike in 2003. In 2004, they 
focused primarily on developing basketball 
products, specifically shoes, through such 
strategies of sponsoring international sporting 
events and employing celebrity spokespeople 
(Cheung). “Mr. Guo and the other Li-Ning 
executives have big plans for Li-Ning sneakers. 
Although they are serving the domestic market 
almost exclusively, they want to begin exporting 
to Europe and the United States—and go 
toe-to-toe abroad with Nike and Adidas, as it 
is currently trying to do in China” (Nocera). 
Li-Ning currently generates only 1 percent of its 
$700 million in revenue abroad, but hopes to 
be generating over $2 billion in revenue or 20 
percent, to come from exports by the year 2013 
(Nocera). The perfect jumpstart to that plan: 
the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
On the greatest world stage, the Beijing 
Olympics provided Li-Ning with a much-
needed golden opportunity to become an 
international icon. Founder Li Ning captivated 
an estimated 4 billion people when he ran 
around the perimeter of Beijing’s National 
Stadium, the “Bird’s Nest,” while attached to 
cables that held him 75 feet in the air, before 
lighting the Olympic cauldron (Hunsberger). 
Not to mention, he was sporting his own 
Li-Ning apparel and shoes. The results: Li-
Ning’s share price rose 6 percent overnight 
(ChinaRetailNews). “About 4.4 million Li-Ning 
shares usually trade everyday. But on Friday, 
9.4 million shares traded. Monday, another 9.8 
million shares were traded” (Guppy). 
During the Olympics, Li-Ning sponsored 
the Chinese gymnastic, table tennis and diving 
teams as well as a variety of other teams from 
around the globe, including the United States 
table tennis team, Sudan’s track and field 
athletes, and Sweden’s Olympics delegation 
(Balfour). “Call it paper-tiger marketing. 
Li-Ning tries to create the illusion of being a 
global player despite its near-total reliance on 
its home market. In addition, the company is 
running an ad campaign called ‘One Team, 
One Belief ” featuring European, African, South 
American—and Chinese—athletes standing 
| in a stadium with their hands across their 
hearts” (Balfour). This image can be seen on 
Li-Ning’s company website. 
Li-Ning also took a different approach from 
its global competitors in Beijing. Adidas spent 
$80 million to be an official Olympic sponsor, 
meaning that whatever country medaled at 
the podium would be sporting their logo. Nike 
decided to sponsor 22 of 28 Chinese teams 
who competed in their gear. Li-Ning came up 
with the unusual marketing strategy of putting 
their trademark on the Chinese television 
journalists. “With the announcer’s strategy, we 
needed a platform for publicizing our product 
and journalists can give us better exposure than 
I can,” said Zhiyong (Rovell). This was a surefire 
way to separate itself from the competition and 
it proved to be successful in the short-term. 
Knowing that it is a smaller business with 
a limited budget, Li-Ning was effective and 
intelligent in its marketing campaign during the 
Olympics. “They are the most efficient marketer 
for the Olympics in terms of spend vs. return,” 
said Greg Paull, a partner at a market researcher 
R3 in Beijing (Balfour). Li Ning now faces 
the challenge of riding the Olympic wave of 
momentum for as long as possible until it can 
think of another clever marketing strategy that 
will help create global branding awareness.
Discussion
So where does Li-Ning stand now that 
the Olympics are over? Still behind Nike. 
Still behind Adidas. The main reason for 
this is not a lack of leaps and bounds the 
company has made due to its ability to become 
asymmetrically independent of its competitors, 
nor is it for a lack of cultural proximity and the 
growing  appeal it is has among the people of 
China. Its marketing strategies are modeled off 
of Nike and have proven to be successful while 
its ability to glocalize a broad form of a product 
has also been more than capable. Instead, the 
problem for Li-Ning is rooted in its lack of 
confidence as a legitimate sportswear company, 
thus it has no solid foundation for its identity. 
“To compete with the big names either at home 
or abroad, Li-Ning may need to decide what it 
wants to be. Today, it’s difficult to say whether 
it’s a trendy brand for urban teenagers or a 
bona fide performance shoemaker, and simply 
creating an image of global reach won’t clear 
that up. The challenge is to link to a brand idea 
that is the basis for enduring loyalty,” said Tom 
Doctoroff, chief executive officer for China 
ad agency JWT (Balfour). The paper-tiger 
marketing and having journalists instead of 
athletes wear their logo are ways in which Li-
Ning offers a lot of show with little substance. 
There is no consumer loyalty with that. 
The lack of confidence in its products has 
caused consumers to have an equal lack of 
confidence. “Li-Ning shoes were purposely 
priced 20 percent below their Nike and Adidas 
equivalent…Li-Ning is simply not confident 
that its current brand can stand up to its big 
Western competitors” (Nocera). The difference 
in company ideology between Nike and 
Li-Ning is critical and directly proportional to 
its successes. Li-Ning COO Guo said, “Why 
should someone buy Li-Ning shoes? It’s about 
value, design and an overall satisfying retail 
experience” (Cheng). He told Nocera, “What 
the consumer cares about is the design, material 
and professional performance” (Nocera).
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Nocera responded, “I thought to myself: 
that’s not what they believe at Nike” (Nocera). 
Charlie Denson, president of Nike Brand 
believes “it’s about youth, it’s about excitement, 
it’s about passion. Our focus has always been 
around the athlete…and supplying them 
with the best possible product to pursue 
their dreams and goals” (Rovell). While 
Nike is focusing on and more importantly, 
promoting, the athlete, Li-Ning is focusing 
on and promoting the company. People 
invest in companies that put their emphasis 
of investment on the consumer. Nike is 
personable. Li-Ning is profitable. Nike has 
the confidence and the mindset that they 
will continue to grow and improve and push 
themselves to provide better sportswear, 
shoes, equipment and apparel for all future 
athletes. “The Olympics are a great point in 
time and the Beijing Olympics are going to 
transcend the world of sport. They will become 
a monumental event throughout the world. It 
represents an incredible opportunity for us as 
a brand to participate in the world of sport at 
the highest level on the biggest stage. It’s a great 
checkpoint for us but its not a destination,”  
said Denson (Rovell). 
In order for Li-Ning to ever reach the status 
and success that Nike has, both at home and 
on a global level, it needs to not only continue 
to model their marketing strategies from Nike, 
but also must adopt their mindset as well. They 
need to establish a company identity and have 
the confidence that they will be successful. 
Li-Ning needs to look at catching up to and 
surpassing Nike, not as a destination, but as a 
checkmark, as their logo simply suggests. 
Li-Ning has been facing troubled times 
ever since China opened its market to foreign 
businesses, but the company has taken such 
tremendous strides in their marketing and 
branding operations that even Nike and Adidas 
have started to pay attention. Li-Ning is coming 
very close to beating Nike at its own game, 
but right now, Nike still remains a dominant 
force with international status: two things 
Li-Ning has yet to accomplish. Will Li-Ning 
ever recapture its market at home? Will it 
ever become an international player in the 
sportswear business? The possibility is certainly 
out there, but only time will tell.
by Kristen Dalton
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